
Maret Vessella, Bar No. 019350 Deputy Chief Bar Counsel State Bar of Arizona 111 West Monroe, Suite 1800 Phoenix, Arizona 85003-1742 Telephone (602) 340-7272



BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER)
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA.)

File No. 01-2449

ROBERT G. CLARK, Bar No. 002881

TENDER OF ADMISSIONS AND AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE BY CONSENT

Respondent.

This Agreement is entered into between the State Bar of Arizona, through undersigned counsel and Respondent, through his counsel Robert J. Hooker, Esq. It is submitted pursuant to Rule 56(a), Ariz.R.S.Ct., and the Guidelines for Discipline by Consent issued by the Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Arizona. Respondent conditionally admits that he failed to adequately supervise a non-attorney staff member and failed to properly manage his client trust account. Respondent conditionally admits that his conduct violated ER 1.15, ER 5.3 and Rules 43 and 44, Ariz.R.S.Ct. The parties agree that the appropriate sanction is a censure, a term of probation and the imposition of costs. There were

no issues of restitution presented in this case. The parties understand that this

FACTS

1. Respondent is, and was at all times relevant hereto, a member of the State Bar of Arizona, having been admitted to practice law in Arizona on September 25, 1971.

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- 2. On December 12, 2001, the State Bar received a non-sufficient fund notice on Respondent's Bank One Arizona trust account. The notice indicated that on December 7, 2001, check number 2363, in the amount of \$200.00 attempted to pay against the account when the balance at the time was negative \$1,342.62.
- On December 21, 2001, the State Bar Staff Examiner wrote to
 Respondent requesting an explanation of the trust account overdraft notice.
- 4. Respondent's office manager, Joyce Chambers, intercepted the State Bar's letters. Ms. Chambers did not advise Respondent of the State Bar letters. Ms. Chamber's answered the letters, however, making it appear that Respondent was providing a response to the State Bar's inquiries.
- 5. Over the next few months, the State Bar wrote to Respondent and requested additional explanation and records. Again, Ms. Chambers responded as if the response was from Respondent.

6. After approximately seven months, on August 1, 2002, Respondent contacted the State Bar's Staff Examiner and explained that Ms. Chambers had left his employ. Chambers advised Respondent that the State Bar was engaged in an ongoing investigation. Prior to that time, Respondent was unaware of the State Bar's investigation.

- 7. On August 9, 2002, Respondent and his counsel met with the Staff Examiner and Bar Counsel and discussed the discrepancies identified in his trust account and submitted records. Respondent agreed to review all the information and documentation submitted by Ms. Chambers and provide clarification and any further explanation required. Respondent also agreed to provide any additional records or documents necessary to resolve outstanding issues.
- 8. The State Bar reviewed records from the time period of December 29, 2000 through December 31, 2001. Those records revealed that Ms. Chambers had been embezzling funds from Respondent. Generally, Ms. Chambers would use the money to pay her personal credit card bills and/or to pay Respondent's credit card bills that she had incurred in Respondent's name. In perpetrating the scheme, Ms. Chambers deposited earned and unearned client funds into Respondent's trust account. Ms. Chambers would then draw disbursements payable to Respondent either forging Respondent's endorsement or using a

signature stamp and then cash the checks. On other occasions, Ms. Chambers would disburse checks from the trust account directly to her creditors.

- 9. Respondent allowed Ms. Chambers to have complete control of his trust account, bank statements, checks, deposit slips, account ledgers, credit card statements and signature stamp.
- 10. Respondent had no measures in place to routinely check that Ms.
 Chambers was in fact maintaining records and making appropriate disbursements.
 - 11. Respondent's trust account bank records revealed the following:
 - a. Respondent failed to properly safeguard client funds.

 Specifically, funds belonging to Pat Prendergast and Mackie

 Torres were misappropriated by Ms. Chambers.
 - b. Respondent failed to keep his funds separate from funds on deposit in his trust account. Specifically, earned fees were routinely deposited into the client trust account.
 - Respondent failed to maintain complete trust account records for a period of five years.
 - d. Respondent failed to exercise due professional care in the maintenance of his client trust account.
 - e. Respondent failed to maintain proper internal controls within his office to adequately safeguard funds on deposit in the trust

account. Respondent failed to conduct a monthly reconciliation of his client trust account. Attached hereto as "Exhibit A" is a copy of the Staff Examiner's Report.

12. Respondent filed a police report outlining Ms. Chambers' theft and embezzlement with the Tucson Police Department.

CONDITIONAL ADMISSIONS

Respondent conditionally admits his conduct violates Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ER 1.15 and ER 5.3 and Rules 43 and 44, Ariz.R.S.Ct.

SANCTION

Respondent and the State Bar of Arizona agree that on the basis of the conditional admissions contained herein the appropriate disciplinary sanctions are as follows:

- 1. Respondent shall receive a censure for his conduct.
- 2. Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of six months.

 The period of probation will begin on the date that the final judgment and order is entered in this matter. During that probation, the State Bar's Staff Examiner will schedule a random review of Respondent's

office procedures and records limited to the operation and maintenance of his lawyer trust account.¹

- 3. Respondent shall pay all costs and expenses incurred by the State

 Bar in these proceedings. A Statement of Costs is attached hereto as

 "Exhibit B".
- 4. Respondent does not owe any restitution in this case. The State Bar identified two clients whose funds were converted by Ms. Chambers.
 - (a) In the course of representing Pat Prendergast in a dissolution proceeding, the parties agreed to direct their state and federal tax return to Respondent for deposit into his trust account and distribution to the parties. Respondent received the returns and they were deposited into Respondent's trust account by Ms. Chambers. When Ms. Chambers disbursed the funds she wrote Mr. Prendergast's check for \$1,000.00 less than the amount to which he was entitled. During the course of the State

¹ Respondent is not being required to attend the State Bar Trust Account Ethics Enhancement Program as he voluntarily attended "Managing your Trust Account" which was offered by the State Bar with instruction provided by the State Bar Staff Examiner. The Course included instruction on proper maintenance of the trust account, keeping and maintaining proper records, and hands-on accounting transactions. The State Bar believes that the term allowing for random review during the probation period will ensure that Respondent has implemented proper procedures with respect to the operation of the trust account and maintenance of corresponding records.

Bar's investigation, Respondent learned of the situation and contacted Mr. Prendergast. Respondent immediately issued Mr. Prendergast a check for \$1,000.00. (See, Exhibit "C")

(b) Mackie Torres paid Respondent a flat fee of \$2,500.00 for services relating to a probate matter. At some point during the representation, Ms. Chamber contacted Ms. Torres and advised that Respondent would need an additional \$750.00 for services. Ms. Torres provided the \$750.00 without contacting Respondent. additional Thereafter, Ms. Chambers again contacted Ms. Torres and requested an additional \$2,000.00. Ms. Torres additional \$2,000.00 again without provided the questioning Respondent. Unbeknownst to Respondent, Ms. Chambers collected the additional amounts from Ms. Torres. It appeared that Ms. Chambers converted those funds to her own use as there were no identifiable deposits into Respondent's trust account with respect to Prior to the investigation into this those specific funds. matter by the State Bar, Ms. Torres requested a refund of

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the \$2,000.00 at the conclusion of her case and Ms. Chambers issued a check in that amount. During the investigation of this matter, Respondent learned of Ms. Chambers requests of Ms. Torres. Respondent returned an additional \$750.00 to Ms. Torres. See, Exhibit "D".

In the event Respondent fails to comply with any of the foregoing terms, and information thereof is received by the State Bar of Arizona, Bar Counsel shall file a Notice of Noncompliance with the imposing entity pursuant to Rule 52(a)(6)(C), Ariz.R.S.Ct. The matter may be referred to a hearing officer to conduct a hearing at the earliest practical date, but in no event, more than thirty (30) days following receipt of said Notice. If the matter is referred to a hearing officer, the hearing officer shall determine whether the terms of probation have been breached and, if so, to recommend appropriate probation have been breached and, if so, to recommend appropriate action and response to such breach. If there is an allegation that Respondent failed to comply with any of the foregoing terms, the burden of proof shall be on the State Bar of Arizona to prove non-compliance by a preponderance of the evidence.

Respondent conditionally admits that he has engaged in the conduct set forth above and the rule violations indicated, in exchange for the form of discipline as set forth above.

Respondent, by entering into this agreement, waives his right to a formal disciplinary hearing that he would otherwise be entitled to pursuant to Rule 53(c)6, Ariz.R.S.Ct., and the right to testify or present witnesses on his behalf at a hearing.


Respondent is represented by counsel in these proceedings. Respondent waives all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or could assert hereinafter, if the conditional admissions and stated form of discipline are approved.

This Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent will be submitted to the Disciplinary Commission for approval. Respondent understands that the Disciplinary Commission may order a hearing officer to conduct an evidentiary hearing, if necessary. Respondent further understands that the Disciplinary Commission may recommend rejection of this Agreement or may propose modifications. Respondent further understands the Disciplinary Commission must approve this Agreement and that this matter will become final upon judgment and order of the Supreme Court of Arizona. If the Agreement is rejected, the parties' conditional admissions are withdrawn.

This agreement, with conditional admissions, is submitted freely and voluntarily and not under coercion or intimidation. I am aware of the Rules of the Supreme Court with respect to discipline and reinstatement. DATED this day of September, 2003. Robert G. Clark Respondent Attorney for Respondent DATED this day of September, 2003. Deputy Chief Bar Counsel Approved as to form and content: Chief Bar Counsel

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1	Original filed this 29 day of
2	September, 2003 with:
3	Disciplinary Clerk of the Supreme Court
4	Certification and Licensing Division 1501 W. Washington, #104
5	Phoenix, Arizona 85007-3329
6	Copy of the foregoing mailed this
7	day of September, 2003 to:
8	Robert J. Hooker 2830 North Swan Road, Suite 120
9	Tucson, Arizona 85712
10	Attorneys for Respondent
11	Copy of the foregoing hand delivered this
12	29 day of September, 2003 to:
13	Towns Decards Manager
14	Lawyer Regulation Records Manager State Bar of Arizona
15	111 West Monroe Street, Suite 1800 Phoenix, Arizona 85003
16	l. Catan
17	by: MV:cs
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Maret Vessella, Bar No. 019350 Deputy Chief Bar Counsel State Bar of Arizona 111 West Monroe, Suite 1800 Phoenix, Arizona 85003-1742 Telephone (602) 340-7272



BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER)
OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA,)

File No. 01-2449

ROBERT G. CLARK, Bar No. 002881

JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE BY CONSENT

Respondent.

The State Bar of Arizona, through undersigned counsel and Respondent, Robert G. Clark, represented by Robert J. Hooker, Esq., hereby submit their Joint Memorandum in Support of the Agreement for Discipline by Consent filed contemporaneously herewith.

As reflected in the Tender of Admissions and Agreement for Discipline by Consent, Respondent failed to adequately supervise his employee who had complete control of his lawyer trust account. The employee embezzled funds from Respondent, misused the trust account and failed to maintain required records. Respondent violated Rule 42, Ariz.R.S.Ct., specifically ER 1.15 and ER 5.3; Rules 43 and 44, Ariz.R.S.Ct.

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The State Bar of Arizona and Respondent agree that Respondent shall be censured, placed on probation for a period of six months, and pay the costs incurred in this disciplinary proceeding. Respondent identified two clients who were entitled to a return of funds and has already repaid those individuals. Under those circumstances, no order of restitution is required in this agreement.

In determining the appropriate sanction, the parties considered both the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards") and Arizona case law. The Standards provide guidance with respect to an appropriate sanction in this matter. The Court and Commission consider the Standards a suitable guideline. In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154, 157, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1009); In re Kaplan, 179 Ariz. 175, 177, 877 P.2d 274 (1994).

In determining an appropriate sanction, both the Court and the Commission consider the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct and the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors.

Matter of Tarlitz, 163 Ariz. 548, 789 P.2d 1049 (1990); ABA Standard 3.0.

Given the conduct in this matter it was appropriate to consider *Standards* 4.1 and 7.0. Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. *Standard* 4.12. Suspension is appropriate for lawyers who are grossly negligent. An example of gross negligence would include failing to

establish proper accounting procedures. See, Comments to Standard 4.12. Respondent had no established procedures to ensure that his employee was properly maintaining and operating his lawyer trust account. That particular failure led to the embezzlement of Respondent's funds and the misappropriation of two clients' funds.

A lawyer's failure to supervise employees resulting in injury is considered under *Standard* 7.0. Reprimand (censure in Arizona) is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system. *Standard* 7.3. Courts have imposed reprimands on lawyers who are negligent in supervising their employees. *See*, Comments to *Standard* 7.3.

In the present case, Respondent knew or should have known that client property was being mishandled by his employee and at risk due to the lack of internal controls. Respondent abdicated all responsibility for the maintenance and operation of his lawyer trust account. Respondent's employee had complete control over all checks, bank statements, deposit slips, account ledgers, credit card statements and Respondent's signature stamp. However, Respondent enjoyed a a seventeen year employment relationship with his employee and had no reason to mistrust her. Under those circumstances, Respondent was negligent in his failure to properly supervise his employee.

As the *Standards* do not account for multiple charges of misconduct, the ultimate sanction imposed should at least be consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct among a number of violations. *Standards* at pg. 6, *Matter of Redeker*, 177 Ariz. 305, 868 P.2d. 318 (1994)

Based on the foregoing, the presumptive sanction for the admitted conduct is a term of suspension. After determining the presumptive sanction, it is appropriate to evaluate factors enumerated in the *Standards* which would justify an increase or decrease in the presumptive sanction.

Substantial mitigation, as is present in this case, can justify a decrease in the presumptive sanction. Respondent was admitted to practice law in the State of Arizona in 1971 and has served the public for thirty-two years without any discipline. Standard 9.32(a). The conduct giving rise to the instant matter was not the product of a selfish or dishonest motive. Standard 9.32(b). When Respondent learned of Ms. Chambers' actions he immediately contacted the State Bar and made every effort to determine the nature and extent of Ms. Chambers' misconduct. In doing so, he answered every inquiry of the State Bar. Respondent obtained and provided records and offered detailed explanations. Standard 9.32(e) In the process of rendering a detailed account of what occurred in his office, Respondent identified two clients who had funds misappropriated by Ms. Chambers. Respondent promptly contacted the individuals and made full restitution.

Additionally, in June 2003, Respondent voluntarily attended a State Bar sponsored continuing legal education course entitled, "Managing your Trust Account." Standard 9.32(d). Throughout this matter, Respondent has demonstrated that he recognizes the seriousness of the situation and his remedial actions were consistent with an interest in removing the potential for reoccurrence. Standard 9.32(l) Substantial experience in the practice of law is usually found to be an aggravating factor. However, that factor can be offset by the corresponding fact that the lawyer has no prior disciplinary record during that same period of time. Matter of Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 876 P.2d 548 (1994). Therefore, the two factors combined may be considered a mitigating factor. Matter of Marce, 177 Ariz. 25, 867 P.2d 845 (1993). In this case, Respondent has substantial experience in the practice of law however, he has never been the subject of prior discipline and those factors combined should be considered in mitigation of the presumptive sanction.

There are no aggravating factors which should be considered in this matter.

As such, the mitigation present in this matter justifies a downward deviation from a suspension to a censure.

PROPORTIONALITY

To have an effective system of professional sanctions, there must be internal consistency, and it is appropriate to examine sanctions imposed in cases that are factually similar. *In re Shannon*, 179 Ariz. 52, 71, 876 P.2d 548, 567

(1994), (quoting *In re Wines*, 135, Ariz. 203, 207 (1983)). However, the discipline in each case must be tailored to the individual case, as neither perfection nor absolute uniformity can be achieved. *Matter of Riley*, 142 Ariz. 604, 615 (1984).

There are two cases which are instructive with respect to this type of misconduct. In Matter of Collins, SB-97-0058-D (July 2, 1997), the lawver was admitted to practice in Arizona in 1986 and was also licensed in California. While living in California, Collins took over the Arizona practice of Anthony The main practice involved debt collection. Leone had employed an officer manager for collections matters and when Collins took over, the office manager remained as collections manager in an independent contractor capacity. Although Collins primarily practiced in California, he was occasionally in the Arizona office and maintained daily contact by telephone. The office manager and bookkeeper were given signatory authority of the firm's accounts to facilitate the collection and transfer of funds into the appropriate accounts. Within the first three months funds collected for six clients were embezzled by the office staff without Collins' knowledge. When Collins learned of the misappropriation he took immediate action by notifying the State Bar, cooperating with the authorities in the prosecution of the office staff and made complete restitution to the affected clients. The case presented significant mitigation and Collins received a censure

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for his failure to supervise his non-lawyer staff and his failure to safeguard client property.

In Matter of Heldenbrand, SB-99-0089-D (January 13, 2000), Heldenbrand was negligent in supervising his employees and he failed to safeguard client Heldebrand acknowledged that he should not have delegated property. administrative responsibility for client files and their accounts. Heldenbrand consented to a censure for violations of ER 1.3, ER 1.4, ER 1.15, ER 5.3, ER 5.4. ER 8.4 and Rules 43 and 44, Ariz.R.S.Ct. There were no aggravating factors present in this matter and five factors present in mitigation. Heldenbrand was censured and placed on probation for a period of two years.

The above-cited cases consider similar conduct which resulted in the imposition of censures. Based on the foregoing, it appears that the recommended sanction is within the range of appropriate sanctions for the admitted conduct.

The agreed upon sanction is consistent with other similar cases and serves to instill confidence in the public and maintain the integrity of the Bar.

CONCLUSION

The objective of lawyer discipline is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, the profession, and the administration of justice. In re Neville, 147 Ariz. 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1985). Recognizing it is the prerogative of the Disciplinary

Commission to determine the appropriate sanction, the State Bar and Respondent assert the objectives of discipline will be met by the imposition of the proposed sanction of a censure, two years probation and costs. DATED this 25 day of September, 2003. б Respondent Attorney for Respondent DATED this 29 day of September, 2003. Deputy Chief Bar Counsel Approved as to form and content: Chief Bar Counsel

]	
1	Original filed this $\frac{29}{11}$ day of
2	September, 2003 with:
3	Disciplinary Clerk of the Supreme Court
4	Certification and Licensing Division 1501 W. Washington, #104
5	Phoenix, Arizona 85007-3329
6	
7	Copy of the foregoing mailed this day of September, 2003 to:
8	
9	Robert J. Hooker 2830 North Swan Road, Suite 120
10	Tucson, Arizona 85712
11	Attorneys for Respondent
12	
13	Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered this
14	29 day of September, 2003 to:
15	Lawyer Regulation Records Manager State Bar of Arizona
16	111 West Monroe Street, Suite 1800
17	Phoenix, Arizona 85003
18	7
19	by:
20	
21	
22	
- 1	